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Abstract 
 
For quite a long time, network industries used to be regarded as (natural) monopolies. This was due 
to these industries having some special characteristics. Network externalities and economies of 
scale in particular justified the (natural) monopoly  thesis. Recently, however, a trend towards 
deregulation of such industries has been observed. This trend started with the successful 
introduction of competition in the telecommunications sector.  The main reason behind this success 
is that the economies of scale have disappeared as a result of emerging new technologies. The 
successful deregulation in telecommunications is in line with micro-economic theory, which predicts 
an increase in efficiency and lower prices when markets are opened up to competition.   
 
The success in the telecommunications sector is often used as an argument for opening up other 
network industries to competition as well. In this paper we analyse whether this reasoning can be 
transposed to the electricity sector. It is argued that the  two sectors, electricity and 
telecommunications, are similar in that they are both network industries which used to be 
characterised by economies of scale, and that technological progress might have put an end to this 
scale effect.  There are however certain differences.  Firstly, technological progress on the supply 
side was accompanied by a strong growth in demand in the telecommunications sector. This 
demand side effect is absent in electricity.  Moreover, due to physical characteristics, the electricity 
sector seems to be more complicated: in order to introduce competition in the sector, it has to be 
split up into subsectors (production, transmission, distribution and supply). Competition is 
introduced in production and supply, transmission and distribution remain monopolies. This splitting 
up creates a new kind of costs, the so-called transaction costs.   
 
The paper is centered around two issues: (a) are the basic assumptions behind the theoretical 
model of the perfectly free market met in the deregulated subsectors? and (b) do the transaction 
costs (partly) offset possible price decreases in competitive segments ? 
 
There is no hard evidence that the hypotheses behind the theoretical model are met in the 
electricity sector, and there are strong indications that these transaction costs might be substantial. 
Moreover, in addition to the deregulation process, the electricity sector is also subject to other 
changes such as the internalisation of externalities (see the Kyoto protocol) and the debate on 
nuclear  energy. These elements could exert an upward pressure on prices. Since electricity is 
ubiquitous, the deregulation process should be closely monitored.  
 
JEL Classification: D23, D41, D42, D43, D62, L12, L13, L94, L96. 
Key words:  Welfare economics; market structure and pricing; organizational behaviour, transaction 
costs, property rights, Electric Utilities, Telecommunications. 
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Liberalisation of network industries :





Liberalisation of the network industries in Europe can 
undeniably be regarded as one of the most radical eco-
nomic changes since the creation of the single market. 
Furthermore, it is not only a process which generates 
heated debate, it also raises many questions. That is, of 
course, due in part to the complexity of the sectors con-
cerned, certainly in the case of the electricity sector.
This study attempts to discuss the issue of the liberalisa-
tion of the electricity sector for the non-specialist reader. 
The speciﬁ  c characteristics of the sector are discussed in 
the light of the liberalisation of the electricity market and 
its potential impact. The reader will ﬁ  nd that most of the 
statistical data relate to the Belgian context, but they 
serve only to clarify a number of concepts and are there-
fore intended purely as an example. The aim is to offer 
a general analysis of the electricity sector without taking 
account of the situation in any particular region. Articles 
to be published later will go into more detail on speciﬁ  c 
situations (such as the European electricity directive and 
its implementation in Belgian law, a detailed discussion of 
the Belgian electricity sector, etc.).
The ﬁ  rst chapter will give a very brief explanation of a few 
aspects of economic paradigms on which both the idea 
of liberalisation and the criticisms of it are based. That 
chapter is theoretical and is intended as a brief résumé of 
the relevant economic theory. It is meant for readers with 
an economics background. Non-economists are asked to 
follow the general outline, at least, in order to become 
familiar with such concepts as cost curves, marginal costs, 
free markets, transaction costs, etc.
Chapter 2 discusses the special characteristics of the 
electricity sector in order to ﬁ  nd out whether those vari-
ous peculiarities of the industry are compatible with its 
liberalisation. In order to gain a clear idea of that, the 
characteristics are often compared with the telecommuni-
cations sector, a network industry which has already been 
liberalised in most countries. Finally, the conclusion sets 
out a summary of the main ﬁ  ndings. The text contains 
a number of boxes which offer readers unfamiliar with 
certain technical concepts sufﬁ  cient information to follow 
the train of thought in the analysis.2 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  See in particular the following manuals : Carlton D. and Perloff J. (1990), 
Cohen S.I. (2001) and Varian H. (2003).
(2)  The marginal revenue is the additional income that a ﬁ  rm earns if it increases its 
production by one unit. The marginal costs are the additional costs that a ﬁ  rm 
incurs if it increases its production by one unit.
(3)  This argument is described in detail in Varian H. (2003).











1.   Theoretical aspects of liberalisation
1.1  Neoclassical micro-economic theory
According to neoclassical micro-economic theory  (1), in a 
free market equilibrium is reached at the point where the 
price equals the marginal production costs. In contrast, 
in a monopoly situation the equilibrium price is higher 
than the marginal costs. The price on a monopoly 
market is therefore higher so that demand is lower. 
This difference between the two types of market can be 
largely explained by stating that in a market with perfect 
competition the producer’s price is regarded as given, 
whereas in a monopoly the producer can inﬂ  uence the 
price level.
Chart 1 illustrates this. On the free market, equilibrium 
is reached at price Pc, which corresponds to the quantity 
of production Qc, i.e. at the point where the supply and 
demand curves intersect. On the monopoly market, equi-
librium occurs at the point where price Pm intersects with 
quantity Qm. These two equilibrium situations are based 
on marginal revenue equalling marginal costs, the point 
at which ﬁ  rms therefore maximise their proﬁ  t  (2). However, 
for the reasons described below, the two markets are 
not in equilibrium at the same point. Given totally free 
competition, the marginal revenue is always equal to 
the market price since, as stated earlier, that is always 
imposed on the ﬁ   rms  : for each additional unit sold, a 
ﬁ  rm earns additional income equal to the market price Pc. 
In contrast, in a monopoly the marginal revenue falls as 
output increases. If the monopolist sells an additional unit, 
his marginal revenue is determined by two factors : on the 
one hand, his revenue increases by the price charged for 
that unit, but on the other hand it falls because the price 
of the rest of his output is equal to the (lower) price of the 
last unit sold  (3). Marginal revenue in a monopoly is shown 
by the curve Rm.
In the light of that situation, the monopoly leads 
to inefﬁ  cient economic allocation, or “Pareto inef-
ﬁ  ciency”. A market is Pareto-optimal if it is not 
possible to improve the situation of any one of the 
economic players without impairing that of another 
player. That is not the case in a monopoly. To under-
stand this, consider the meaning of the demand and 
supply curve. The demand curve shows the maximum 
price that consumers are willing to pay for a given 
quantity. The supply curve shows the minimum price 
– equal to the marginal costs – that the produc-
ers are willing to accept for a particular quantity of 
production.
Chart 1 reveals that if production increases above the 
monopoly equilibrium (Qm, Pm), consumers are prepared 
to pay a higher price than the minimum required by the 
producers, since the demand curve is above the supply 
curve at this point. That ﬁ  nding is true for all levels of 
production between Qm and Qc. By expanding produc-
tion from Qm  to Qc, it would be possible to achieve 
Pareto improvements, since for each price between 
the supply and demand curves the satisfaction of cer-
tain economic players would increase without affect-
ing that of the other players. In contrast, above Qc no 
further Pareto improvement is possible  : in contrast to 
the monopoly, free competition is therefore an efﬁ  cient 
market. Furthermore, it is easy to show that the increase 
in well-being, typical of free competition, is equal to the 
area A + B.
That reasoning is the most important theoretical basis 
for the policies aimed at liberalisation which have been 
deﬁ  ned in the European Union in recent years. As with 
Adam Smith and his theory of the invisible hand, it refers 
to the idea that, by allowing the free market to operate, 
we achieve the optimum allocation of resources. However, 
that logic gives rise to objections which, more particularly, 
call into question its basic assumptions. Those objections 
are discussed in the next section.3 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1) CREG  (2001b).
(2)  See Dixit A. and Pindyck R. (1994) for the effects of uncertainty on investment 
decisions.
(3)  See Pénard T. (2002).
(4)  See Baumol W., Panzar J. and Willig R. (1982) on contestable markets.
1.2  Criticism
Perfect competition is based on a number of assump-
tions :
–    the market determines the price : producers and con-
sumers cannot inﬂ   uence the price. That condition is 
met if the producers and consumers are very numer-
ous ;
–   the information is perfect : producers and consumers 
have all the necessary information on the operation of 
the market ;
–   the product being traded is homogenous : all producers 
sell an identical product ;
–    freedom to enter and leave the market : ﬁ  rms can enter 
and leave the market without incurring special costs.
In reality, the conditions are very seldom met. Most of the 
markets monitored fall between the two extremes  : free 
competition and monopoly.
If the ﬁ  rst condition is not met, that is usually because the 
market is an oligopoly, which means that there are only a 
few competitors active on the market. In an oligopoly, one 
of the competitors – usually the biggest ﬁ  rm – frequently 
has market power (or monopoly power) and can there-
fore impose a price higher than the competition price. 
For example, a ﬁ  rm may have market power because it 
produces more cheaply than its competitors, or because 
its product is better in quality. When setting their prices, 
the other ﬁ  rms will have to take account of the behaviour 
of the dominant ﬁ  rm. In the electricity production sector, 
for example, the Belgian regulator (CREG) published a 
study in 2001 which focused on the problems relating to 
market power  (1).
The degree to which the perfect information condition 
is met depends on the market. Inadequate informa-
tion leads to uncertainty which hampers the optimum 
operation of the market, leading to higher prices or 
lower quality products. The economic players seek 
information, but that search has a price (in time and / or 
money). If they ﬁ  nd that that price exceeds the beneﬁ  ts 
of the information, they stop their search and base their 
decision on the available data. If the information is 
inadequate, players who are not interested in risks are 
inclined to stick to their earlier decisions. For example, in 
a context of liberalisation, that explains why – at least in 
an initial phase – consumers do not necessarily choose 
the cheaper products offered by a new competitor. 
Uncertainty also affects the behaviour of ﬁ  rms, which 
may postpone their investments pending more informa-
tion on future prospects  (2).
The situation in which the homogeneity condition is not 
met is known as monopolistic competition. On such a 
market, each ﬁ   rm sells a product that differs to some 
degree from its competitors’ products (at least, that 
is how the consumers see it). Those differences give 
the ﬁ  rms a certain amount of market power. If a ﬁ  rm 
increases its price, it will not lose all its customers, as the 
customers consider that the products of other ﬁ  rms are 
not a perfect substitute for the product of the ﬁ  rm in 
question. Examples of monopolistic competition are very 
numerous and extremely varied.
Freedom to enter or leave a market is another condition 
which is seldom met in the real world. Many markets 
have access barriers, i.e. impediments hampering or 
delaying the entry of new competitors. Examples are 
the cost advantages enjoyed by established ﬁ  rms, the 
existence of economies of scale necessitating substan-
tial investments for new players wishing to enter the 
market, and speciﬁ  c rules or restrictions. Since they limit 
competition at source, access barriers enable the estab-
lished ﬁ  rms to increase their prices without having to 
take account of the entry of new competitors. The utility 
companies, for example, traditionally face substantial 
access barriers, more particularly as regards access to 
the network and the existence of economies of scale  (3). 
Finally, according to the contestable markets theory, a 
market can operate competitively with a small number 
of producers. If a market is contestable, i.e. if newcom-
ers are liable to enter it, ﬁ   rms in fact feel obliged to 
adjust the competition price. If they were to charge a 
higher price, then new competitors would immediately 
enter the market  (4).
This hypothetical research shows that perfect competi-
tion is in fact very rare  : it must be viewed primarily as a 
reference framework for assessing other types of market. 
In the light of the liberalisation of a monopoly, the real 
aim is therefore never to achieve the optimum situation 
but rather to come close to it. If the conditions are clearly 
not met, the increase in efﬁ  ciency may not outweigh the 
costs associated with regulating and rectifying the mar-
ket’s shortcomings.4 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
Box 1  –  The cost curves
Micro-economic theory assumes that the average cost and marginal cost curves are U-shaped. This is because 
of the hypothesis that, as a ﬁ  rm grows, it achieves returns to scale which initially increase, then stagnate and 
ultimately decline (given constant technology). That hypothesis is illustrated in chart I which shows, on the one 
hand, the pattern of total production costs (TC) and, on the other, the pattern of average (AC) and marginal (MC) 
costs. For a given level of production, the level of the average costs is determined by the slope of the line through 
the origin and the point on the costs curve. The change in marginal costs is derived from the slope of the tangent 
at each point on the total costs curve.
This hypothesis concerning the pattern of costs is based on the following economic argument. If a ﬁ  rm’s 
activity expands, the ﬁ  rm can use its workers more efﬁ  ciently by making them specialise or by making more 
rational use of basic materials. The ﬁ  rm is then in a phase of increasing returns to scale  : production rises 
faster than the production costs, which means that the average cost price falls. That phase corresponds to 
the production interval OA in chart I. However, the advantages of increasing the size of the ﬁ  rm are not 
unlimited. From a certain point onwards, problems arise in regard to labour organisation or the exchange 
of information. If those disadvantages increase, the ﬁ  rm enters a phase of diminishing returns to scale : the 
costs increase faster than the production, so that the average cost begins to rise. Beyond point A in chart I, 
that phase applies to all levels of production.











Most economists do in fact consider that, in a number 
of situations, if a market is not operating well it can no 
longer allocate resources efﬁ  ciently. The commonest rea-
sons for an inefﬁ  cient market are : natural monopolies and 
externalities.
A natural monopoly is a situation in which the aver-
age production costs fall continuously as the quantity 
produced increases. The market’s total production costs 
are always lower if just one, and no more than one, ﬁ  rm 
produces the goods. Natural monopolies occur most fre-
quently in the utility sector, because the ﬁ  xed costs are 
very high and the marginal costs are very low (cf. box 1).5 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
The natural monopoly is an exception to the cost hypothesis. In a natural monopoly, the average costs continue 
to fall as production increases  : returns to scale continue to increase. In contrast to the classic hypothesis of the 
U-shaped cost curve, the average costs take the form of a declining curve as shown in chart II.
O O





(1)  Bergstrom T. (1971).
(2)  See for example Stiglitz J. (2003).
(3)  The theoretical ideas on transaction costs and vertical disintegration are mainly 
the work of R. Coase and O. Williamson. For example, see Coase R. (1937) and 
Williamson O. (1975).
We  talk about external effects if an economic player’s 
activity leads to beneﬁ  ts (positive external effects) or costs 
(negative external effects) for other players. The supplier-
producer takes no account of these costs. Pollution (nega-
tive external effect) is the most commonly cited example 
of external effects. For example, in the case of polluting 
industrial sectors, the producer takes account only of the 
ﬁ  rm’s own production costs, whereas there are also exter-
nal costs, such as the costs of cleaning up rivers, global 
warming or health care for residents who become the 
victims of air pollution.
Finally, it must be said that Pareto-optimality does not 
guarantee the fair distribution of wealth : an efﬁ  cient 
market may be an unfair market. Researchers have actu-
ally shown that an economy based on slavery may be 
efﬁ  cient in the sense of Pareto  (1). That is precisely why 
the government intervenes and requires ﬁ  rms to provide 
public services, such as the obligation to supply all con-
sumers at an affordable price (universal service). More 
generally, certain economists such as J. Stiglitz, Nobel 
prize winner in 2001, are opposed to over-systematic use 
of the market, denouncing its excesses  (2).
1.3  Vertical disintegration and transaction costs
Electricity is brought to the end user in four phases (this 
will be discussed in detail in the next section) : production, 
transmission, distribution and sale. In the transmission 
and distribution phases, competition is excluded because 
they exhibit the characteristics of a natural monopoly and 
feature network externalities. In the context of its liber-
alisation, the electricity sector must therefore undergo 
vertical disintegration in order to separate non-competing 
segments (transmission and distribution) from the poten-
tially competitive segments (production and sale). That 
vertical disintegration is associated with transaction costs 
between the various segments, costs which are unavoid-
able in the case of purchase and sale on a market  (3).
To  sum up, we can say that, according to the transac-
tion cost theory, there are two methods of effecting any 
transaction : internally, within a ﬁ  rm, or externally, on the 
market. There are numerous “hybrid” forms between the 
two methods, such as ﬁ  xed-term contracts or alliances. 
Any method can be used for certain transactions in so 6 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  Joskow P. (2002).
far as it makes it possible to limit the transaction costs. If 
the internal transaction costs are lower than costs on the 
market, ﬁ  rms decide to arrange certain activities them-
selves rather than calling on the market, and vice versa.
The transaction costs on the market include more par-
ticularly the costs of collecting information, the costs of 
negotiating and executing contracts and the potential 
costs associated with coordination and supervision of the 
market by an independent body. The transaction costs for 
internal governance consist mainly of the costs of moni-
toring and coordinating personnel. The larger the ﬁ  rm, 
the greater the interaction between the workers and the 
higher the costs.
In theory, the vertical integration of activities is desirable if 
the market transaction costs are higher than the costs of 
internal governance. That is generally the case if :
−   the transaction relates to a speciﬁ  c asset, i.e. a product 
or service which is produced specially for the speciﬁ  c 
needs of a limited number of customers. That situation 
makes the customer and the supplier vulnerable ;
−   the transaction is associated with an exchange of 
information : in that case there is the risk that one of 
the parties may fail to meet his obligations, and that is 
difﬁ  cult to monitor ;
−   the transaction is subject to uncertainty : in that case it 
is difﬁ  cult to achieve a balance in the application of the 
contract to future developments, and that may place 
one of the parties in a risky position ;
−   the transaction requires intensive coordination, neces-
sitating the establishment of a coordinating body, for 
example.
As emphasised by P. Joskow, the gains from the liberalisa-
tion of certain segments of the sector has to be compared 
with any increase in the transaction costs resulting from 
vertical disintegration (1). The second part of this document 
argues that the transaction costs arising from the vertical 
disintegration of the electricity sector may be consider-
able, even if they cannot be quantiﬁ  ed owing to the lack 
of data.
2.     The electricity sector ; speciﬁ  c 
characteristics in the light of the 
liberalisation debate
2.1  Introductory concepts
Chapter 1 of this article examined the theoretical back-
ground and the motives for introducing free markets. 
On the one hand, theory shows that competition leads 
to efﬁ  ciency and lower prices. On the other hand, it was 
pointed out that the theoretical model is based on many 
underlying assumptions, and that this paradigm never 
occurs in reality. Moreover, the latest economic ﬁ  ndings 
seem to indicate that a liberalised market, and more 
particularly the way in which it is implemented, entails 
new costs and therefore does not necessarily lead to 
lower prices.
This chapter takes a closer look at a number of very spe-
cial characteristics of the electricity sector. Each individual 
characteristic is undoubtedly present in other sectors, but 
the combination and interaction of the characteristics 
make the electricity sector unique. The result is that some 
basic assumptions of the theoretical free market model 
are only partly satisﬁ  ed. Furthermore, the breaking up of 
the previously vertically integrated operation entails addi-
tional transaction costs.
Since experience gained from the telecommunications 
sector is often cited in the debate between advocates of 
liberalisation and its opponents, the speciﬁ  c characteris-
tics of the electricity sector will be addressed as far as 
possible by reference to the similarities and differences in 
relation to the telecom sector.
Deregulation of the electricity sector begins with breaking 
up the sector into four basic segments :
1.   Electricity production.
2.   Transmission of the electricity via the high voltage 
network.
3.   Distribution of the electricity via the low and medium 
voltage network.
4. Sale of the electricity to the end users.
It is generally assumed that the transmission and distribu-
tion remain monopolies, while the production and sale 
can be liberalised. To prevent any distortion of compe-
tition, there has to be strict segregation between the 
monopolistic and liberalised segments.7 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
















(1)  This is a somewhat simpliﬁ  ed situation, particularly as some large users are 
connected directly to the high voltage network. In addition, owing to several 
characteristics of the electricity supply, a number of markets are required 
(day-ahead, real-time, etc.). That point will be discussed later in this article.
The remaining monopolies require a regulatory body 
which, jointly with the national competition authori-
ties, supervises competition in the liberalised segments. 
This is :
5. The electricity sector regulator.
This chapter will reveal why a sector-speciﬁ  c regulator is 
necessary. It will also show that, with a view to the reli-
ability of the system, a coordinating body is necessary, 
namely :
6.   The independent system operator in charge of coor-
dination.
The presence of an independent system operator in the 
electricity sector is due to the need for coordination 
between the various players in the electricity sector. That 
coordination is necessary because there is no direct link 
between producers and consumers, so that the stability 
of the entire system can only be guaranteed with the 
cooperation of all producers (this is explained in sections 
2.3 to 2.7). As already stated, the price ﬁ  xed in a free 
market should comprise the necessary incentives to 
ensure that coordination. The presence of a system man-
ager is therefore already an indication of a number of 
shortcomings in the free market.
Finally, there must be a mechanism for setting prices in 
the liberalised segments :
7. The price mechanism and the derivatives.
It must be said that, except for point 7, all these functions 
are also performed in a vertical operation. In a vertically 
integrated ﬁ   rm, the internal decision-making process 
ensures that all these functions are mutually coordinated. 
The division into sub-segments creates a need for a new 
coordination mechanism. In the free market, this is of 
course the price mechanism.
The physical characteristics of electricity supply impose 
separate requirements on this price mechanism (see 
section 2.7.2). Replacement of the internal decision-
making process by a market mechanism, and the need to 
coordinate the electricity system, necessitate an intensive 
exchange of information and hence additional transac-
tion costs. As already remarked, these transaction costs 
could partly offset any price reductions in the liberalised 
segments.
For a simple presentation of the structure, see ﬁ  gure 1.
A consumer (household or ﬁ  rm) concludes a contract with 
an electricity supplier for the supply of electricity during a 
speciﬁ  ed period. The consumer is free to choose the sup-
plier. A market therefore exists.
The supplier must in turn purchase electricity from an 
electricity producer. For that purpose, he concludes a 
contract direct with a producer, or turns to an electricity 
exchange  (1).
Production and consumption seldom take place at the 
same location. The electricity which is generated therefore 
has to be transported to the consumer via the transmis-
sion and distribution network.8 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
Box 2  –  Liberalisation of the Belgian electricity sector
Transposition into Belgian law of European Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market 
in electricity has led to following structure for the sub-segments mentioned above.
−   Production  : like most of the Member States, Belgium opted for a licence system. The licences are granted by 
the federal minister responsible for Energy. The three main Belgian producers are Electrabel, SPE and EDF  (1).
−   Transport of electricity : a distinction is made between the transmission network (high voltage) and the distribu-
tion network (low voltage).
   The management of the transmission infrastructure was assigned to a newly established company, Elia Assets 
N.V. Elia is therefore responsible for extending and maintaining the high voltage network.
   The operational management of the network, mainly the coordination of demand and supply and the avoid-
ance of overloading, was entrusted to Elia Systems Operator, which is therefore responsible for coordinating the 
actions of producers and consumers.
   The distribution network is the responsibility of the (pure or mixed) intermunicipal associations and public 
authorities. They take charge of the management of the physical distribution network.
−   Supply : prior to liberalisation, the municipalities had a monopoly on the supply of electricity in their area. The 
directive provides for progressive liberalisation of the market according to the customer’s annual consumption. 
However, the supply of electricity to households and SMEs is a regional matter, and when the directive was 
transposed into Belgian law the regions opted for a varying implementation timetable. In the Flemish region, 
consumers have all been free to choose their supplier since 1 July 2003. The Walloon and Brussels regions have 
not yet set any ofﬁ  cial date, but according to the directive every consumer must have a free choice there, too, 
by no later than 1 July 2007  (2).
   In Flanders, licensed suppliers include Electrabel Customer Solutions, Nuon, Essent, Luminus, EDF, and 
SPE / Citypower.
−   The regulator  : at federal level, the regulator’s task is entrusted to the CREG (Commissie voor Regulering van 
Electriciteit en Gas). The CREG advises the federal government.
   In addition, there is a regulator for each region. The regional regulators also act as both advisory bodies and 
supervisory authorities. For Flanders, this is the VREG (Vlaamse Commissie voor Regulering van Elektriciteit en 
Gas)  ; for Wallonia it is the CWaPE (la Commission Wallonne pour l’Énergie)  ; ﬁ  nally, for Brussels it is the BIM 
(Brussels Instituut voor het Milieu).
   The regional regulators also take charge of the procedures relating to electricity from renewable sources via the 
mechanism of the green electricity certiﬁ  cates and Combined Heat and Power certiﬁ  cates.
−   Pricing  : in Belgium, prices are set mainly via bilateral contracts. An electricity exchange is also being set up, 
in which Elia would be the main shareholder. APX (the Dutch exchange) and Powernext (the French electricity 
exchange) would be minority shareholders.
(1)  EDF has a share of 50 p.c. – or 481 MW - in the Tihange 1 power station via its Belgian subsidiary, Semobis
(2)  The big companies have access to a liberalised market since 1 january 2003.
The transport costs entailed are passed on to the consumer.
Metering equipment has to be built into the network to 
provide sufﬁ  cient information for correct invoicing.
Box 2 translates ﬁ  gure 1 into the Belgian context.
Before all the segments are discussed in detail, the 
next section will ﬁ  rst give a brief account of the liber-
alisation of the telecom sector, the reference sector for 
this study. Doing so the differences and similarities in 
relation to the electricity sector can then be properly 
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(1)  The competition between Belgacom and Telenet explains the success of 
broadband technology in Belgium. It is doubtful whether the same success would 
have been achieved by placing the network infrastructure with an independent 
operator (as in the electricity sector).
(2)  This is only true from the technical angle. The invoicing of these mutual 
connections gives rise to various problems, the reason being that there is usually 
asymmetry of information between the operator and the regulator. That makes it 
impossible for the regulator to estimate the true costs of the mutual connection, 
so that excessively high termination tariffs may ensue (see for example BELTUG, 
“De liberalisering van de telecommunicatie – de balans van de zakelijke 
telecomgebruikers”).
(3)  The network advantage does not disappear entirely as a result of the relatively 
high tariffs for mutual connections. For example, calls between customers using 
the same mobile network are cheaper than between customers using different 
mobile networks.
(4)  The ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) broadband technology uses the 
existing copper wiring between the exchange and the end user. The operator 
only needs to install a DSLAM (DSL Access Multiplexer) in the exchange. The 
end user has to have a “splitter” (to split the voice signal and the data signal 
transmitted via the same pair of copper wires) and an ADSL modem.
2.2   The liberalisation of the telecommunications 
sector
The structure of the telecommunications sector is less 
complex than that of the electricity sector. A relatively 
simple device (telephone, fax, PC, GSM) is connected to a 
second device via a communication network. The devices 
can be identiﬁ  ed by a number.
The activities of the telecom sector comprise the establish-
ment and maintenance of a communication infrastructure 
(telephone cables, exchanges, GSM masts, etc.) which are 
used to provide the actual service (voice, SMS, data trans-
mission, etc.).
Since telecommunication is a service, there is no pro-
duction segment. Transmission and distribution in the 
electricity sector correspond to the network infrastructure 
of telecommunications, as the service that uses that infra-
structure can be compared with the supply of electricity 
to end users.
In contrast to the situation in the electricity sector, it is 
not only the sale of services that is being liberalised, but 
competition is also being introduced into the network 
infrastructures  (1). Within the telecommunication sector 
it is therefore possible to have multiple network infra-
structures.
In Belgium, mobile network operators include Proximus, 
Base and Mobistar. Fixed telephony operators include 
Belgacom, Telenet, Codenet, British Telecom, etc.
The infrastructures of the various operators are interlinked 
so that the customers of one particular operator can be 
connected to customers of another network operator. In 
technical terms, it is relatively easy to interlink telecom-
munication networks  (2) (later on, this article will show that 
this is not the case for electricity transmission).
The regulator regulates the tariffs charged for the mutual 
connections (also known as termination tariffs) between 
the various operators.
Most telecom service providers have their own infrastruc-
ture, though sometimes it is only small. In large cities 
and business parks, in particular, customers can choose 
among alternative suppliers. Naturally, the old monopolist 
(in Belgium that is Belgacom) has an advantage over new-
comers for historical reasons. As its network offers wider 
coverage, it can take greater advantage of the “network 
effect” (the greater the number of customers, the greater 
the beneﬁ  ts for all customers). This network advantage 
is reduced somewhat  (3) by the interconnections between 
the networks of various operators.
The greater coverage also implies that each customer, 
regardless of location, can be linked to the network at 
relatively low cost. The high level of coverage offered by 
the former monopolist in comparison with newcomers is 
the reason for the “local loop” problem : in many cases, a 
new network operator will only be able to give new cus-
tomers access to his own network by making use of part 
of the network belonging to the historical operator.
The analogy between the electricity sector and the 
telecommunication sector is as follows :
  Electricity  Telecommunication
  production –
  transmission network  infrastructure
  distribution local  loop
  regulator regulator
   independent
  system manager  –
  supply service
  price-setting price-setting
In the telecommunication sector, competition was intro-
duced in both the service and the network infrastructure. 
In the electricity sector, supply and production have been 
liberalised.
For a long time, the telecommunication networks (and 
electricity production) were characterised by economies 
of scale. Technological progress has changed that. 
For instance, in telecommunications new multiplexing 
techniques have made it possible for the network’s 
capacity and speed to be greatly increased at relatively low 
additional expense  (4). The fact that it is relatively simple 
to interconnect the various networks is also an essential 
condition (which is met in the case of the telecom sector) 
for introducing competition into the infrastructure 
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(1)  A natural monopoly is a theoretical concept in which the average costs continue 
to fall and the MES is therefore inﬁ  nitely large. In practice, we talk about a 
natural monopoly if the MES is much larger than the market. This may therefore 
vary over time.
(2)  It should be pointed out that, in theory, the market has in fact been extended 
from a national market to a European market.
(3)  VDSL stands for Very High Rate Digital Subscriber Line.
(4)  In order to implement VDSL in Belgium (the Broadway project), Belgacom will 
have to upgrade a major part of its network (for optimum capacity, the glass ﬁ  bre 
network has to be brought as close as possible to the user, because the speed 
declines rapidly the greater the distance from the optical network); that was not 
the case when ADSL was introduced (when it was possible to use the existing 
copper wiring). The investment will total 520 million euro over a 10-year period. 
(See “Belgacom stopt 522 miljoen euro in superinternet”, Tijd, 20.06.2003).
Telecommunication networks are also multifunctional. 
They are used to transmit sound, data and images. Data 
transmission really took off with the advent of the inter-
net. Apart from reducing the economies of scale, this has 
also led to increased volume on these networks.
The efﬁ  ciency of a monopoly depends on the extent of 
the economies of scale (the “minimum efﬁ  cient scale” or 
MES  (1)) and market size.
Whether or not economies of scale will then lead to a nat-
ural monopoly depends on the relative size of the econo-
mies of scale in relation to the size of the total market  ; 
if the MES is larger than the market, then a monopoly 
is efﬁ  cient. As the market expands, the efﬁ  ciency of a 
monopoly may therefore decline.
At this point it must be said that such a phenomenon 
is not happening in the electricity sector  (2). Since the 
electricity network has only one function, namely the 
transport of electricity, and in view of the problems of 
interconnection, the market’s size has not increased in 
practice.
The increase in volume on the telecommunication net-
works while costs have remained more or less steady has 
also led to a sharp fall in the average costs.
In telecommunications, liberalisation therefore took 
place in the context of technological improvements with 
low costs on the supply side, combined with increased 
demand generated by new applications. The two effects 
together bring down the average costs.
This cross-fertilisation between the demand and supply 
sides is absent in the electricity sector. The introduction 
of new technologies by the producers (CCGT power sta-
tions) is not accompanied by a growing number of appli-
cations, so that demand is not rising. On the contrary, in 
the electricity producing sector there is instead a tendency 
to inhibit demand for environmental reasons.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, after the broadband 
networks, the next generation of telecommunication 
networks is already in the pipeline (VDSL  (3), operating at 
roughly 10 times the speed of ADSL). These new networks 
will facilitate digital television and video on demand, for 
example. However, in contrast to the previous generation, 
they will require very substantial investments in this new 
network infrastructure  (4). Consequently, the introduction 
of this new technology entails substantial costs. New 
applications on the demand side may lead to increased 
use. To what extent that will reduce the average costs 
(and hence the tariffs) depends on the relative size of 
the two effects. It is therefore far from certain whether 
liberalisation will be as beneﬁ  cial in this case, because a 
producer will only decide on the necessary modernisation 
if he is more or less certain of his future market.
To  sum up, we can say that in the telecommunication 
sector :
1.   the production segment does not exist ;
2.   the network infrastructure corresponds to the transmis-
sion and distribution of electricity. However, it should 
be remembered that in the telecom sector competition 
was introduced in the network infrastructure as well. 
Later we shall show that this is more or less impossible 
in the electricity sector ;
3.   there is also a regulator supervising the sector ;
4.   there is no independent coordinator. We shall also 
show that a coordinator is in fact necessary for techni-
cal reasons in the electricity sector ;
5.   the provision of a service via the infrastructure is com-
parable to the supply of electricity ;
6.   apart from technological progress which has reduced 
the economies of scale, the telecommunication serv-
ices market, unlike the consumption of electricity, has 
expanded strongly with an ensuing reduction in the 
average costs. That also reduces the relative impor-
tance of the MES and increases the potential number 
of operators.
Not only does the structure of the telecommunication 
sector therefore appear to be simpler than that of the 
electricity industry, the deregulation in the two sectors 
also took place in different segments  : the production 
segment in the case of electricity and the network seg-
ment for telecommunications. The arguments in favour 
of deregulating these two different segments (particularly 
the disappearance of economies of scale) will be analysed 
later in this article.
The sections which follow examine the electricity sector 
sub-segments. However, the sequence has been adjusted 
to make the reasoning clearer and to avoid too many 
explanations of concepts.11 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)   ELCON (2004)
(2)  See Le Monde, 30.09.2003
(3)  The economic concept of a “universal service” is broader than the system of 
social tariffs.
(4)  Capacity is not the same as consumption. This is explained in box 3. If capacity of 
7,000 MW is used for a quarter of an hour, that implies consumption of 






















































































































CHART 2  VOLATILITY OF BELGIAN DEMAND FOR 
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2.3  Sale (supply) and consumption
Society can no longer function without electricity  ; con-
sumption continues to rise, both in the production pro-
cess and in households.
Increasing automation and the associated support pro-
cesses are causing a huge increase in dependence on 
electricity worldwide.
The effects of the blackout in the US on 14 August  2003, 
in particular, demonstrated the importance of a reliable 
electricity system. Although there are variations in the 
estimates of the economic impact of that blackout, 
almost all of them come to between ﬁ  ve and ten billion 
dollars  (1). The blackout in Italy on 28 September in the 
same year is actually said to have caused three people to 
lose their lives  (2).
It is therefore not surprising that electricity supply is 
regarded as a universal service  (3) ; everyone must have 
ready access to it at all times and at a reasonable price 
(see also the last section of 1.2).
There are also few substitutes for electricity, so that 
demand for electricity is not very price sensitive. That is 
certainly true in the short term.
On top of this limited price elasticity, there is also the great 
volatility of electricity consumption, both during the day 
and during the year. That is evident from chart 2, which 
shows Belgian electricity consumption on a winter’s day 
(9 January 2003) and on a summer’s day (3 August 2003), 
per quarter hour and also as a daily average.
The average demand for capacity varies in Belgium from 
7,000 MW in the summer (for an explanation of the units, 
see box 3 below) to 12,000 MW in the winter  (4).
The variation between the lowest and highest capacity 
during any day may be as much as 4,000 MW.
TABLE 1 ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION IN BELGIUM IN 2002
(In GWh)
Source: FPE, Annuaire statistique 2002.
(1) Some industrial customers recover residual heat from their production process for 





High Voltage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,470.3
Energy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,899.5 2.36
Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265.8 0.33
Industry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,026.5 47.27
Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,125.2 2.64
Public Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258.6 0.32
Trade and Public Services   . . . . . . 10,894.7 13.54
Low Voltage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,920.2
Residential  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,602.1 21.88
Professional  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,155.5 8.90
Public Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426.7 0.53
Public Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735.9 0.91
Autoproducers (1)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,047.6
Energy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.2 0.02
Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 0.02
Industry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 986.2 1.23
Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 0.00
Public Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.2 0.04
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80,438.1 100.0012 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  This volatility can be the result of the production costs of the different types of 
power stations and / or an insufﬁ  cient capacity of production (§ 2.4.2 – § 2.4.3).
(2)  In this context, see the problems in California where market dominance in 
production and climatological factors drove up prices. This caused problems for 
electricity suppliers confronted by ﬁ  xed selling prices.
(3)  In periods of low demand, reserve capacity is used to raise the water level in 
these reservoirs so that subsequent peaks in demand can be covered.
Box 3  –  A number of commonly used units
In physics, energy refers to the capacity to perform “work”. There are various types of energy : mechanical energy 
(moving objects), thermal energy, electrical energy (kinetic charges), etc.
The various forms of energy are interchangeable. For example, kinetic energy is converted to thermal energy by 
friction.
Electricity generating stations are based on this principle. For example, gas power stations burn gas and the 
resulting thermal energy is converted to electricity.
However, the conversion from one form of energy to another always entails a loss of energy, and that applies 
equally to electricity generating stations. The ratio between the electricity produced by a generating station and 
the energy used as input (known as primary energy) denotes the power station’s efﬁ  ciency.
  efﬁ  ciency = electrical energy produced/primary energy used
The efﬁ  ciencies of a number of electricity generating stations are given below as an illustration :
  coal  40 to 45 p.c.
  CCGT  (1)  60 p.c.
  gas turbine  40 p.c.
  nuclear  33 to 36 p. c.  (2)
  hydro  90 to 95 p.c.
  wind turbine  35 p.c.
Source : Eurelectric, “Efﬁ  ciency in electricity generation”, July 2003.
(1)  CCGT : Combined Cycle Gas Turbine.  A power station in which gas is used as fuel to drive a turbine, and in which the hot combustion gases are recovered and used 
to drive a steam turbine.
(2)  Tarjanne (2003) assumes 37 p.c. efﬁ  ciency for nuclear power stations. 
Referring to ﬁ  gure 1 ; the price between the producer and 
the supplier is highly volatile, whereas that between the 
consumer and the supplier is far less volatile.
This price risk for the supplier does not exist in a vertically 
integrated operation. Indeed, that is also the reason for 
the  reintegration  taking place between producers and 
suppliers.
To illustrate this, table 1 shows Belgian consumption and 
its distribution among various types of consumer. The dif-
ference between high and low voltage is explained in a 
box in section 2.5.
Total consumption came to 80,438 GWh. That demand 
was met by production in both Belgium and other 
countries (see table 3 later on in this article). The supply 
totalled roughly 85,730 GWh. The difference between 
the two (5,292 GWh) is attributable to network losses 
(see box 5) (3,767 GWh) and to the use of electricity to 
pump water up into the reservoirs  (3) (1,525 GWh).
Furthermore, these peaks only occur during a lim-
ited period. The maximum capacity (approximately 
13,500 MW) is demanded for between one and two 
hours a year. That has a considerable impact on the pro-
duction segment, where sufﬁ  cient reserve capacity has to 
be provided to cope with these short-lived peaks.
The volatility of demand gives rise to a highly volatile 
demand curve and therefore, in a liberalised market, to 
unstable prices as well. These volatile prices  (1), combined 
with the universal service, do present risks for suppliers, as 
the latter have to obtain their supplies on a market where 
prices ﬂ  uctuate very widely, whereas their selling prices 
are usually not very volatile, or are even virtually ﬁ  xed 
owing to the universal service  (2).13 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
Energy is expressed in joules. The letter J is the abbreviation for the unit joule.
A second key variable is the amount of “work” that can be performed per unit of time, in other words the speed 
at which work can be done. This is called power, and is expressed in watts (abbreviated W). A watt is equal to 
1 joule per second.
The power generated is therefore equal to the energy produced divided by the time taken to produce the 
energy.
  Power = energy produced / time
Energy can therefore also be expressed as power multiplied by time (watt x hours), so that an alternative unit of 
energy is the Watt-hour (Wh). In the electricity sector, the Wh is more commonly used than the joule.
The conversion is carried out as follows :
  1W = 1J/1s = 1J/(1/3600h) = 3,600 J/h.
  1Wh = 3,600 J
Another common unit is the Whe. As already stated, energy conversion is always accompanied by loss. The energy 
content of the input fuel for an electricity generating station is denominated in Whf. The resulting electrical energy 
is denominated in Whe. The ratio between the two is the power station’s efﬁ  ciency.
Finally, the preﬁ  xes should be explained :
– Kilo (K) means 1,000 units, i.e. 1 kilowatt is 1,000 watts
– Mega (M) means one million units or 1,000 kilo
– Giga (G) means one billion units or 1,000 Mega
– Tera (T) is 1,000 Giga
The biggest consumer is industry, accounting for roughly 
half the total Belgian consumption. One ﬁ  fth of the total 
electricity consumption goes to households. Public light-
ing consumes barely 1 p.c.
2.4  Production
The production of electricity is the conversion from a partic-
ular form of energy into electrical energy (see also box 3). 
For instance, if fossil fuels are used (natural gas, coal, oil), 
heat is converted to electricity.
Deregulation of the electricity sector opens the produc-
tion segment to competition. Nonetheless, it has long 
been thought that there are economies of scale available 
in electricity production, which was therefore monopo-
listic in its structure. Technological progress, and more 
particularly the advent of the CCGT and CHP power sta-
tions, should end these economies of scale and permit 
competition in this segment.
CCGT power stations have in fact made it possible to 
produce electricity on a small scale. However, their vari-
able costs depend very much on the volatile price of oil. 
In addition, this small-scale production still does not allow 
consumers to arrange their own production. The ques-
tion is therefore whether sufﬁ  cient conditions are actually 
met for a free market to lead to efﬁ  cient production. That 
requires an understanding of the cost structure.
Before considering a number of characteristics of electric-
ity production, it should be remembered that this produc-
tion segment does not exist in the telecommunication 
sector. Telecommunication is a service and therefore does 
not require any production, by deﬁ  nition. All the problems 
mentioned below are therefore typical of the electricity 
sector  (1).
(1)  It could be said that a telephone “produces” a signal, but the actual service is the 
communication between two devices; in other words the demand does not relate 
to the signal produced, but to the connection. The service therefore exists only 
on condition that the two devices are connected via the network. The network is 
therefore essential to the communication; in the case of electricity, the role of the 
network is different, as will become clear later on in this article.14 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
TABLE 2 COST STRUCTURE OF POWER PLANTS
Source: R. Tarjanne, K. Luostarinen: Competitiveness comparison of the electricity production alternatives (price level March 2003).
(1) The annual investment costs take account of the total investment costs and the useful life of the power station.
(2) The variable operating costs of nuclear power stations also include the payments into the “nuclear waste fund” and therefore take account of the processing and the 
temporary and permanent storage of radioactive waste, and subsequent dismantling of the power stations.
(3) According to Tarjanne (2003), these emission costs fluctuate between 10 and 100 €/tCO2.
Nuclear Coal Gas Wind
Power (MWe)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,250 500 400 1
Efficiency (in p.c.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 42 58
Lifetime (years)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 25 25 20
Investment costs per KWe (€/KWe)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,900 860 600 1,100
Real Intrest rate (in p.c.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5555
Annuity factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.16 14.09 14.09 12.46
Annual investment costs per (€/MWe) (1)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110,729 61,019 42,571 88,267
Annual fixed operation costs per MWe (€/MWe)  . . . . . . . . . . . 28,500 17,200 12,000 22,000
Annual fixed costs (€/MWe)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139,229 78,219 54,571 110,267
Fuel costs (€/MWhe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.70 13.10 23.45
Variable operation and maintenance costs (€/MWhe) (2)  . . . . . . 3.63 5.24 2.00
Vaiable costs (€/MWhe)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.33 18.34 25.45 0.00
CO2 emissions costs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CO2 emissions (kg/MWhe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 811 346
Emission allowances costs (€/tCO2) (3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10
Variable CO2 emissions costs (€/MWhe)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Nuclear waste costs   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2)
2.4.1  Cost structure of electricity production
Broadly speaking, the internal costs of electricity produc-
tion can be divided into three categories :
1.   Investment costs  : these are the costs of constructing 
the power station. They vary greatly according to the 
type of power station, and are highest for nuclear 
power stations and hydro-electric plants (see table 2). 
The investment costs determine whether or not econo-
mies of scale exist.
2.   The costs of the primary fuels. Both the level and the vola-
tility of these costs depend on the primary fuel selected. 
The level depends mainly on the size of the fuel reserves 
and the transport costs. The volatility depends on geopo-
litical factors and the concentration of the reserves.
   Fuel costs for renewable sources (hydro, wind and solar 
power) can be considered negligible. The prices of ura-
nium and coal are generally low and relatively stable. 
In contrast, the price of gas is linked to that of crude 
oil, and tends to be volatile. The growing demand for 
natural gas and the limited, concentrated reserves 
imply widely ﬂ  uctuating and increasing prices  (1).
3.   Operating costs  ; these include staff costs, mainte-
nance costs and other expenses.
However, there are other expenses in addition to these 
internal costs :
4.   Externalities. The emission of greenhouse gases, nitro-
gen oxide and sulphur oxide generated by burning 
fossil fuels, particularly coal, implies high but uncertain 
costs for this type of power station. In the case of 
nuclear power stations, the costs of waste disposal 
have to be taken into account.
Table 2 is an example of this cost structure, based on 
Finnish data.
As regards the cost structure of what are called renewable 
energy sources (water, sun and wind), see the AMPERE 
report  (2) : for wind turbines, the investment costs are 
the biggest expense. Although the conditions are more 
favourable if the turbines are installed at sea (more wind), 
the investment costs are much higher. Finally, it should 
be pointed out that wind turbines do not produce at full 
capacity throughout the year since their output depends 
on the strength of the wind.
(1)  In this connection, see also : Federaal Planbureau (2004).
(2)  AMPERE (2000), section F, chapter 3 for wind power and section F, chapter 6 for 




















CHART 3  AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 
GENERATING STATIONS – EXCLUDING THE 
















(1)  This is the ﬁ  gure cited in Tarjanne (2003).
(2)  AMPERE (2000), section F, chapter 3, reports production of 1,200 GWh / year for 
a capacity of 500 MW in the case of installation on land. This implies production 
for 2,400 hours per annum. In the case of installation at sea, production totals 
3,000 GWh for a capacity of 1,000 MW, i.e. 3,000 hours per annum.
(3)  This article does not address the question whether the payments into the 
“nuclear waste fund” will be sufﬁ  cient to cover the subsequent dismantling of 
the power station and disposal of the radioactive waste. The interested reader 
is referred, for example, to Posiva Oy, “Into Olkiluoto bedrock, Final disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel in Finland” or, in the case of Belgium, to CREG (2001a).
(4)  Other sources, such as DGEMP-DIDEME (2003), assume CO2 costs ranging 
between 4 and 50 euro / tonne CO2.
(5)  This applies to the burning of coal. However, the same power stations can be 
used to burn biomass, which produces much lower CO2 emissions.
The investment costs for HEP (Hydro Electric Power) sta-
tions are very high, and make this type of power station 
unsuitable for small-scale production.
The data in table 2 were used to produce the graphs in 
charts 3 and 4, in order to provide a clearer idea of any 
economies of scale.
The chart shows the average costs (i.e. the total costs 
divided by the number of hours’ production) for four 
types of power station  : nuclear, coal, CCGT and a wind 
turbine. The cost of CO2 emissions is disregarded. In view 
of the linear cost structure (see also box 4), the three 
curves decline.
For production ranging between 0 and 3,400 hours per 
annum, the average costs are lowest for a CCGT power sta-
tion ; for production ranging between 3,400 and 5,300  hours 
per annum, a coal-ﬁ  red power station is cheaper, and from 
5,300 hours per annum upwards the nuclear power station 
is cheapest to run. The chart also shows that where produc-
tion exceeds 4,500 hours per annum, the CCGT cannot 
compete with a nuclear power station.
For the wind turbine, a distinction is made between what 
is possible in theory and what is feasible in practice, as it 
has already been pointed out that, owing to its depend-
ence on wind strength, a wind turbine’s production capac-
ity is limited (in the chart it produces 2,200 hours  (1) (2)). 
This limited availability implies that the declining cost 
curve cannot be fully exploited, which in turn means that 
the wind turbine comes out the most expensive despite 
the absence of variable costs. The use of multiple wind 
turbines does not resolve the problem.
Chart 3 takes account of the external effects in the case of 
a nuclear power station, but not in the case of the gas and 
coal-ﬁ  red power stations  (3). Table 2 also offers information 
on CO2 emissions. Estimates of the cost of CO2 emissions 
vary widely. Tarjanne’s study arrives at a cost of between 
10 and 100 euro per tonne of CO2  (4). By way of example, 
costs per tonne of CO2 are  taken  as  10  euro / t CO2. The 
results are shown in chart 4.
Owing to the higher CO2 emissions of coal-ﬁ  red power 
stations, the variable costs of the latter become so great 
that they cease to be competitive  (5). CO2 emissions also 




















CHART 4  AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 
GENERATING STATIONS, INCLUDING CO2 COSTS 
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Box 4  –  Linear cost structure
Micro-economic theory assumes a U-shaped cost structure, which is due to the duality between production and 
costs and to the law of diminishing returns. An electricity producer’s cost curve is different, and has a non-convex 
shape. The implications of this non-convexity are discussed below in the speciﬁ  c case of a linear cost curve.
Studies on electricity production usually assume a linear cost structure (see for example Tarjanne R., Luostarinen  K. 
(2003)), in other words
TC (Q) = FC + AVC×Q, where
TC = total costs,
FC = ﬁ  xed costs,
AVC = average variable costs,
Q = quantity produced.
It follows that
MC = AVC
AC = FC / Q + AVC
MC = marginal costs
AC = average costs
Since the ﬁ  xed costs are positive, the average costs always exceed the marginal costs.
The behaviour of producers in a free market shows that the supply curve of a competing producer is equal to the 
part of the marginal cost curve that exceeds the average variable costs (this is known as the shut-down condition). 
However, the producer only makes a proﬁ  t if the price exceeds the average costs.
But as demonstrated above, in the case of linear cost curves the marginal costs are always less than the average 
costs. The marginal cost rule therefore always leads to a loss. Because in this case
p = MC = AVC (where p represents the price) so that Proﬁ  t = p x Q – FC – AVC x Q = – FC 
can no longer compete with nuclear power stations once 
production exceeds 3,800 hours per annum.
For a small number of hours’ production, wind turbines 
are the cheapest to operate. In theory, they are therefore 
ideal for use in peak periods. However, owing to their 
dependence on the wind they are not entirely suitable 
for that purpose. From a ﬁ   nancial/economic point of 
view, they cannot compete in terms of basic costs with 
a nuclear power station which produces for 7,000 to 
8,000 hours per annum, bringing the average costs to 
roughly 25 euro/MWh. That is about half the production 
costs of the wind turbine.
However, wind turbines should be used as much as pos-
sible for ecological reasons, but that can only be done if 
alternative resources are available when there is no wind. 
Taking account of the external costs therefore not only 
increases the cost of the electricity production, but also 
changes the order in which the various types of power 
station should be used.17 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
Given a linear cost structure, the marginal cost curve takes on an “unnatural shape”, a horizontal line followed 
by a vertical line once maximum capacity is reached.
Tariff-setting on the basis of marginal costs therefore always leads to negative proﬁ  ts in the case of a linear cost 











2.4.2   The permanent equilibrium between demand and 
supply
The various methods of producing electricity need to be 
combined with the characteristics of demand for electric-
ity. The concept of the load duration curve is introduced 
for that purpose.
The daily demand proﬁ  les mentioned above make it pos-
sible to draw what is called a load duration curve which 
shows, for each level of capacity, the percentage of the 
year in which that capacity is required. The curve for 
Belgium is shown in chart 5.
The chart shows that a capacity of 6,000 MW is needed 
throughout the year. The load ﬁ  gure applicable more or less 
all the year is called the base load ; the load required for only 
a small proportion of the time is called the peak load. The 
rest is the intermediate load  (1). The chart is based on the daily 
demand proﬁ  les as shown in chart 2, where the minimum 
load was 6,000 MW and had to be available throughout the 
year. The maximum load of 13,500 MW was required to be 
available for just a few hours each year. These two ﬁ  ndings 












































































(1)  DGEMP-DIDEME (2003) deﬁ  nes the base load as a minimum of 5,000 hours per 
annum, the intermediate load is between 3,000 and 5,000 hours per annum and 
the peak load is below 3,000 hours per annum.18 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  Cf. the black-out in Italy on 28 September 2003 when, owing to the cessation of 
imports from Switzerland, within a few seconds 55 million people were cut off 
and left without electricity for several hours.
(2)  In Norway, where liberalisation was initiated earlier, roughly 85 p.c. of households 
purchase electricity under contracts comprising an adjustable price (Statistics 
Norway (2003)).
(3)  Passing on price volatility to the consumer is not without its costs, as it 
necessitates the installation of new metering equipment on the end user’s 
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CHART 6  ELECTRICITY PRICE ON APX (1)
Source : APX.
(1)  APX : Amsterdam Power Exchange, the Dutch electricity exchange.
Electricity cannot be stored at reasonable cost. Peaks and 
troughs in demand therefore cannot be covered by stock-
piling, as they can for most goods.
This implies that any increase in demand has to be met 
immediately by increasing electricity production, in other 
words there is a permanent equilibrium between demand 
and supply in the case of electricity. That is particularly 
true (see the section on transmission and distribution) 
since any imbalance between demand and production 
could have catastrophic consequences  (1)  for the entire 
system.
The volatility of demand combined with the required 
permanent equilibrium between demand and supply 
necessitates :
1.   Adequate  reserve (production) capacity  to cater for 
peak demand. However, in a free market it is by no 
means clear who will provide this reserve capacity, 
especially as it is already apparent (in charts 2 and 5) 
that peak capacity is only used for a few hours each 
year.
  Another problem is that it takes several years to build 
a power station, so that any shortage of capacity can 
only be rectiﬁ   ed in the medium term. A shortage 
will therefore lead to higher prices which, in theory, 
will prompt expansion of capacity or entry to the 
market  ; it will take years to achieve a new equilib-
rium. Furthermore, there is the risk that higher prices 
may lead to excess capacity in the medium term, 
thus causing prices to fall too low. Equilibrium would 
then only be achieved after a number of oscillations 
(Cobweb theorem).
and / or
2.   A mechanism for controlling demand. In a free market, 
that is the price mechanism. In peak periods, the con-
sumer would therefore have to pay a higher price than 
in off-peak periods. However, passing on that price 
volatility to the “small” consumer would be viewed as 
contrary to the principle of the universal service.
  Day and night tariffs do exist, but they do not in any 
way reﬂ  ect the volatility depicted in chart 2  (2) (3).
The necessary balance between demand and supply has 
an additional implication. It must be possible to adjust 
production in line with every change in demand. That 
restricts the scope for using “green” power stations.
Although these power stations can be speedily adjusted, 
their availability is not always guaranteed. That applies 
particularly to wind and solar power stations, and to a 
lesser extent to HEP stations as well.
The above ﬁ   ndings lead to the conclusion that the 
production costs are inevitably highly volatile. The load 
proﬁ   le and the coordination of demand and supply 
require the use of means of production with a varying 
cost structure. At low loads, the cheapest power station 
is used and the market price is low. During peak periods, 
expensive capacity is brought in, and it has to be ﬁ  nan-
cially viable during this limited period of use  ; naturally, 
that means a high price (see chart 6).
Here it must once again be stressed that this volatil-
ity is due to the cost structure and the usability of the 
various types of power station  ; in other words, that 
volatility will always exist, even if there is no shortage 
of capacity.19 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
TABLE 3 GENERATION CAPACITY AND ELECTRICITY 
PRODUCT FOR BELGIUM







Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,546.4 78,142.7
of which:
Nuclear   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,761.0 44,986.7
Fossil   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,846.2
27,987.4
Combined Heat and Power  . . . 1,272.7
Hydro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,413.0 1,476.1
Wind  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.0 57.2
Import  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,657.8
of which:
France   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,586.2
Export   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,069.9
of which:
The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,817.3
In the context of the liberalisation debate, it must be 
pointed out that producers with a combination of pro-
duction facilities are in an advantageous position. There is 
only one market price, so that in peak periods the power 
stations with the lowest average costs make the biggest 
proﬁ  t. The higher proﬁ  ts made by those “base load power 
stations” can be used to push down the price in peak 
periods, making it more difﬁ  cult to enter the market.
Finally, we take a look at the characteristics of the Belgian 
production facilities (Table 3).
At the end of 2002 the generating capacility was roughly 
15,500 MW. The load curve (chart 5) shows that this is 
sufﬁ  cient to cater for the peaks so long as all units are avail-
able, because the maximum peak is roughly 13,500  MW. 
Chart 5 also shows that a capacity of roughly 6,000   MW 
is required at all times. The nuclear power stations there-
fore produce throughout the year (except during their 
maintenance periods). A power station’s capacity factor is 
deﬁ  ned as the annual production divided by the theoretical 
maximum annual production. For the Belgian nuclear 
plants, that is 44,987 GWh  /  ( 5,761 x 365 x 24) GWh 
= 89 p.c. The Belgian nuclear power stations therefore 
produce for roughly 90 p.c. of the year. The remaining 
10 p.c. consists of maintenance periods. For the thermal 
power stations, the capacity factor is 39 p.c., which means 
that thermal power stations (including combined heat and 
power) are therefore in use for less than 40 p.c. of the 
time. This is not only due to the maintenance periods but 
is mainly down to their use as peak capacity. Once again, 
this reveals that a large part of the production capacity is 
used for only very limited periods.
The total Belgian capacity is amply sufﬁ  cient to cover total 
Belgian consumption (see table 1), as the total potential 
production is 15,546 MW x 8,760 hrs = 136,183 GWh, 
while total consumption  (1)  in the same year came to 
85,730  GWh. This “excess” production capacity is neces-
sary to cater for peak demand and maintenance periods.
Measures to smooth the demand curve (production 
cannot be levelled out because electricity cannot be 
stored) reduce the need for reserve capacity and there-
fore also cut the cost of the production capacity. In many 
cases, the reserve capacity also consists of relatively old 
power stations (i.e. ones which cause more pollution), so 
that keeping down peak demand has two effects, namely 
cutting the costs of the production capacity and reducing 
CO2 emissions.
2.4.3 Increased uncertainty and investment
Earlier in this article, it has already been shown that the 
expansion of production capacity is “spasmodic”. This 
has a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence on the market. Thus, bringing 
a new nuclear power station into use with a capacity of 
1  GW will endanger the production of the existing, more 
expensive power stations. Such discontinuous increases in 
capacity lead to greater uncertainty over output.
Indeed, that uncertainty is further exacerbated by numer-
ous other factors :
− unpredictable selling prices  ;
−   uncertainty over the prices of the fuels used (especially 
the price of natural gas) ;
−   the supplier’s freedom of choice also increases uncer-
tainty over output ;
− the costs of externalities.
In a vertically integrated monopolistic market there was 
mainly uncertainty over the prices of the primary fuel. 
The monopolist was in fact the customer’s only source of 
supply, the spasmodic expansion in production capacity 
took place within a single company and any impact on 
the existing capacity was therefore taken into account 
in the investment decision. The (uncertain) costs of CO2 
emissions are new, but are not due to liberalisation.
(1)  This is true provided that all capacity is available, and that the consumption 
pattern is even.20 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  This could change if the fuel cell makes a breakthrough in the future, because 
then it would be possible to produce on a smaller scale, and less account would 
have to be taken of the existing negative externalities. A transmission network 
can in such a case only be justiﬁ  ed for swapping surpluses.
(2)  In order to obtain a quantity of energy Q, the producer has to produce a quantity 
Q + V, where V represents the losses.
Selling prices were regulated  ; the regulation was mostly 
based on cost-plus tariffs. In this case, the regulated con-
sumer tariff is equal to the costs plus a “reasonable” margin. 
The producer is therefore sure of his income which (in abso-
lute ﬁ  gures) continues to increase the more he invests.
This cost-plus tariff may, however, lead to excess capacity 
and hence to higher costs.
According to its supporters, the free market mechanism 
would overcome this problem and result in lower prices.
There is no doubt that the cost of electricity produc-
tion is largely due to the need for reserve capacity. Even 
so, substantial excess capacity does push up the cost. 
Liberalising electricity production will therefore reduce 
that excess capacity. However, the question is whether 
this will result in the optimum reserve capacity, because 
the outcome could equally be a shortage of capacity. In 
that case, the cost of the electricity production will be 
lower, but the mismatch between demand and supply 
will drive up the consumer price to far above the cost 
price, so that producers make large margins. According 
to the theoretical model, these “above-normal” margins 
will attract new producers into the market and therefore 
lead to expansion of capacity. However, the assump-
tion here is that access will be free and they will enter 
immediately.
It has already been demonstrated that the heterogeneity 
of the production capacity may form an access barrier  ; 
limited transmission capacity and regulation are other 
examples of barriers.
Nor do newcomers enter immediately, because it takes 
several years to build a new power station, and the 
increased uncertainty means that producers will not 
invest until there have been several successive periods of 
higher prices.
2.5  Transmission and distribution
Transmission and distribution are dealt with jointly 
because the associated problems are similar, although 
some of them are greater for one type of activity than 
for the other. This will be explained more clearly later on 
in this article.
The transmission network is essentially a meshed network 
where, for physical reasons, the voltage is maintained at 
a high level. The distribution network is primarily radial 
and operates at medium and low voltage (see box 5). It is 
the distribution manager who takes charge of connecting 
the customers.
The need to transport electricity arises because of the 
difference in the size of the production and consumption 
units, but also because production units cannot always be 
built in the vicinity of the consumption locations owing to 
the regulations (environment) and for technical reasons 
(HEP stations have to be sited at dams, thermal power 
stations have to be sited on water courses because of the 
need for cooling water). The pooling of reserve capacity is 
another reason for providing a transmission network.
The difference in scale between the production and con-
sumption units is a fundamental difference in relation to 
telecommunication and provides a totally different reason 
for the existence of the network  (1). In this last sector, the 
network is an essential element of the service.
The transmission and distribution of electricity are gen-
erally regarded as natural monopolies because it is not 
practicable to build multiple networks, in contrast to the 
telecom sector where the network segment has also been 
opened up to competition. In principle, if multiple net-
works are constructed, that also diminishes the network 
advantages. In the telecommunication sector this problem 
was overcome by expanding the mutual links between 
the networks of the various operators. One of the points 
demonstrated in this section is that such interlinking of 
electricity networks could cause stability problems.
As already stated, transporting electricity entails transport 
losses. In other words, if electricity is transported from a 
producer to a consumer, a quantity of electricity will be 
lost in the process. That loss has to be made up in one 
way or another  (2).
In order to limit the loss, alternating current is used (see 
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Box  5 – Network  losses
Physics states that electricity consists of a stream of moving negative charges, the electrons. They produce either 
continuous movement (direct current) or oscillating movement (alternating current) within a conductor.
In the case of direct current, the charges therefore move from left to right. In the case of alternating current, the 
charges oscillate. The speed of oscillation is called the frequency. This frequency is an essential parameter of the 
system and must be constantly maintained at the right level.
However, in both cases electrical energy is converted into heat, and energy is therefore lost (this is called the Joule 
effect). This is due to friction between electrons within the conductor.
Physics demonstrates that this loss is proportional to the square of the strength of the current and the resistance 
of the wire. That resistance is in turn proportional to the length of the wire and in inverse proportion to its diam-
eter.
The loss therefore increases the further the electricity is transported (length of the cable) and the stronger the 
current. If the current is doubled in strength, the loss actually increases by a factor of four.
In the case of transport over very great distances (i.e. transmission) the loss is great owing to the length of the 
wire. If the current is very strong, that causes the loss to increase sharply.
In comparison with direct current circuits, however, alternating current circuits have one very favourable character-
istic, namely that the strength of the current – and therefore the loss - can be reduced by increasing the voltage 
(using transformers). That is why the transmission network transporting electricity over great distances operates 
at high voltage (in excess of 30 kilovolts). The distribution network, which transports electricity over shorter dis-
tances, operates at medium and low voltage (less than 30 kilovolts).
It is in order to minimise the loss that electricity systems are usually alternating current systems  (1).
Direct Current
Alternating Current
(1)  In this connection, see the debate between two well-known physicists, namely Edison and Tesla. The former was in favour of direct current (with the negative 
characteristic of increasing lossens) while the latter advocated alternating current (where high voltages could be dangerous). In the end, Tesla seems to have got 
it right.22 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
TABLE 4 TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION LOSSES
(In GWh)
Source: FPE, Annuaire Statistique 2002.
1992 2000 2001 2002
Demanded power  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67,439 82,848 83,571 84,206
Transmission and distribution losses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,568 3,682 3,755 3,768
Net Consumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63,871 79,166 79,816 80,438
Losses (in p.c.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 4.4 4.5 4.5
At ﬁ  rst sight, the loss appears relatively small, but it does 
imply a substantial quantity. For example, we can assess 
it at the average spot price on APX (30 euro  /  MWh in 
2002, 46 euro  /  MWh in 2003). The lower price gives a 
total of 113 million euro, the higher price 173 million 
euro.
Transport losses are essentially transport costs which the 
consumer should therefore pay. However, for that pur-
pose it would be necessary to be able to count the cost of 
transport between two points. That is impossible owing 
to another physical characteristic of electric current, 
namely  Kirchhoff’s laws  (see box 6). Those laws imply 
that at a junction in a network, incoming current cannot 
be made to ﬂ  ow through one particular outgoing line, 
but automatically distributes itself among all the outgoing 
lines. This has a number of far-reaching implications for 
the electricity network.
−   It is not possible to deﬁ  ne a path along which the cur-
rent is transported. Nor is there any direct link between 
producer and consumer.
−   Overloading of a line within the network is difﬁ  cult to 
manage and requires intervention by the producers  (1).
   This operational management of the maximum line 
capacity is nevertheless of vital importance. If a line is 
overloaded, it may fail so that neighbouring lines also 
become overloaded and are in turn liable to fail, and 
so on. In other words if overloading is not rectiﬁ  ed, the 
whole system may fail. Moreover, the maximum load 
for a line depends on the outside temperature.
   Furthermore, overloading of certain lines creates 
“market segments” within which certain players can 
acquire a dominant position (2). One example is the 
limited capacity for mutual links at the Belgian / French 
border.
−   Any change to an incoming current can produce an 
effect capable of being felt hundreds of kilometres 
away by the network (known as the loop ﬂ  ows)  (3).
   The possibility of these currents means that the expan-
sion of capacity within the network requires close exami-
nation. For instance, an increase in capacity at the border 
between France and Belgium may have an impact on the 
load on transmission lines at the Belgian coast.
It must also be said that the volatility of demand requires 
the installation of adequate reserve transmission capacity. 
This has to be ﬁ  nanced by differential pricing between 
peak and off-peak network use  (4).
Finally, the construction of high voltage lines often gives 
rise to considerable opposition, so that it is subject to strict 
regulation. As a result, their construction is also associated 
with long lead times. This problem is even more acute in 
the case of international transmission, because there are 
more parties involved, although the transmission manag-
er’s income is less uncertain than that of the producers, 
so that future investment in the network is more or less 
guaranteed.
Transport losses also occur in telecommunication 
networks. “Repeaters” have to be installed at regular 
intervals in order to strengthen signals that have become 
weak. However, the telecom operator can resolve that 
problem without the intervention of other parties.
The problem of overloading is also not unique to the 
electricity network, and arises in telecommunication net-
works as well. However, Kirchhoff’s laws do not apply to 
the latter  ; instead, the junctions are intelligent switching 
(1)  Production is reduced on one side and increased on the other in order to reduce 
the trafﬁ  c via the line. This has to be done within a relatively short space of time.
(2)  In the single European market in electricity, the limited capacity for interlinking 
national networks creates national markets within which the historical producers 
retain a dominant position.
(3) In  Belgium these loop ﬂ  ows can be very substantial (up to one-third of transmission 
capacity with France) and may even cause problems. See for example “La Belgique 
craint les ‘ﬂ  ux fantômes’ d’électricité” in L’Echo, 30.09.2003 en “Elia wapent zich 
tegen stroompannes” in De Standaard, 12.06.2002.
 (4) This is the tariff component that gives rise to a difference between peak and 
off-peak prices, just as in the telecommunication sector.23 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  However, the historical operator retains an advantage because over the years his 
network has become more widespread and has a greater number of connections 
(network advantage implies that the beneﬁ  ts to a user increase the greater the 
number of connections).
Box  6 – Kirchhoff’s  laws
Kirchhoff’s laws relate to incoming and outgoing currents at a junction in the network.
A current is represented by I, and consists of moving charges. The ﬁ  rst of Kirchhoff’s laws states that no charge 
can be lost at a junction, and that the incoming and outgoing currents must therefore be equal.
  I1 + I2 = I3 + I4 + I5
The second of Kirchhoff’s laws states how the incoming current is distributed over the outgoing currents. This 
distribution depends on the resistance of the outgoing cables.
There is therefore no possibility of directing the current to a particular junction. The incoming current distributes 






points which can direct an incoming signal via a speciﬁ  ed 
outgoing line. Here it is therefore possible to determine a 
communication path linking two parties.
Owing to the possibility of directing the signal, overloaded 
lines can also be avoided and trafﬁ  c can be diverted via 
less busy lines.
Moreover, the impact of overloading of a telecom line is 
far smaller. In the case of an overloaded line, the user has 
to try again later ; an overloaded electricity line can cause 
the whole system to fail via cascade effects.
In the liberalised telecommunication sector, multiple com-
munication networks are licensed (Belgacom network, 
Telenet, mobile telephony, etc.)  (1). These networks are 
much easier to interlink than electricity networks. It can 
therefore be said that, if electricity networks are inter-
linked, the reliability of the entire system depends on 
the weakest network (as a result of the cascade effects). 
Telecommunication networks are far more independent of 
one another, even if they are interlinked.
The multifunctionality of the telecommunication network 
has already been mentioned (transmission of data and 
images as well as sound). Multifunctionality spreads the 
infrastructure costs over a larger volume, reducing the 
average costs.
New technologies (multiplexers and advanced modems) 
make it possible to handle this increased volume with no 
signiﬁ  cant increase in costs.
In telecommunications, economies have of scale have 
therefore declined as a result of technological progress. 
Moreover, economies of scale do not lead to a monopoly 
unless the most efﬁ  cient level of production (lowest point 
on the average cost curve) exceeds the market, in other 
words the economies of scale have to be related to the 
market size. In the telecommunication sector the market 
has expanded enormously, particularly with the advent of 
the Internet.24 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  For Belgium this is the Belgian Institute for  Post and Telecommunication, the 
BIPT.
2.6  Regulator
It is the regulator’s job to supervise the monopoly seg-
ments (transmission, distribution), including the tariffs set 
for their services.
The regulator must also monitor competition in the seg-
ments open to competition. However, that task is per-
formed jointly with the existing competition authorities.
The telecommunication sector also has a regulator of that 
type  (1).
Although some areas are exempt, the regulator has an 
inﬂ  uence on all parts of the electricity sector. However, 
side effects must be avoided somehow. Frequently chang-
ing regulations will further exacerbate the uncertainty and 
discourage essential investment.
Also, owing to non-uniformity, market operation may be 
disrupted in the competing segments. A speciﬁ  c case in 
point is the variation in the regulations on nuclear plants 
in Europe, which distort competition, especially in the 
base-load segment of production, since the costs of 
nuclear power stations are considerably lower than those 
of other types of plant, as has been explained (see above 
and below). The selective banning of this primary energy 
source therefore confers an advantage on the remaining 
nuclear power producers. It therefore seems absolutely 
essential to address this issue uniformly throughout 
Europe.
2.7  Coordination with a view to reliability
2.7.1  Need for coordination
The individual problems in the sub-segments require the 
enforced coordination of all elements in order to install a 
reliable system.
In the case of a vertically integrated operator, that func-
tion was an internal matter. However, when competition 
was introduced that function was “externalised” in a new 
body, the independent system operator.
In a liberalised market, the coordination of the various 
segments is left to the price mechanism. Owing to the 
special characteristics of electricity production and the 
mutual interaction, however, that market mechanism is 
not sufﬁ  cient and has to be supplemented by a coordinat-
ing function.
The independent system operator looks after the stability 
of the network and is responsible in particular for :
1.   The continuous coordination of demand and supply, or 
what is known as frequency control.
2.   Compensating for network losses.
3. The loading of high voltage lines.
4. The monitoring of unidentiﬁ  ed currents.
All this comes under the heading of “ancillary services”. 
They are entrusted to an independent body because the 
intervention of multiple parties is necessary to resolve any 
problems.
The preceding sections have repeatedly stressed the need 
for a continuous balance between demand and supply. 
If there is a sudden change in demand (which tends to 
be the rule rather than the exception, given the volatil-
ity of demand), the system operator records a fall in the 
frequency on the network. In order to avoid a total black-
out, he therefore has to increase production (as demand 
is inelastic).
Since there is no connection at all between consumer and 
producer, the system operator cannot directly indicate 
which producer supplyies the customer whose consump-
tion has increased. He therefore has to call on the cheap-
est producer.
In practice, this means that the system operator must 
have information on such factors as the offered prices of 
the producers, any parts of the network which may be 
overloaded, etc.
He can only obtain that information from the various pro-
ducers and from the owner of the transmission network. 
Mechanisms must therefore be provided for exchanging 
this information.
The problem of the network  loss is comparable. The 
system operator also has to increase production to com-
pensate for the loss, and to do so he has to call on other 
players.
In the event of overloading, there is too much current 
ﬂ  owing along the line. According to Kirchhoff’s laws, that 
current cannot be diverted to other lines. This problem 
can only be resolved by reducing production at one end 
of the line and increasing it at the other. Here, too, it is 
necessary to call on the electricity producers and, in the 
longer term, on the owner of the transmission capacity to 
increase the capacity of the network.25 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
(1)  The (N-1) rule is often applied to maintain system stability. This means that the 
system must continue to function properly following the failure of any random 
element. The system operator conducts checks at regular intervals to see whether 
this rule is still respected.
(2)  On Nordpool, the electricity market for the Scandinavian countries, roughly 
1/3 of all consumption is traded on the spot market, the rest being determined 
in bilateral contracts (see Bergman L. (2002)).  On the Dutch exchange, APX, 
the corresponding ﬁ  gure was only 11 p.c. in 2003, while on the French market, 
Powernext, it was 5 p.c. in the same year (see CREG (2004)).
It is therefore the responsibility of the system operator to 
ensure the reliability of the system  (1). However, to do so 
he has to call on other participants.
As we have said, mechanisms are needed for these inter-
actions between the participants and the system operator. 
Either that is a market where the system operator can 
buy electricity, or the system operator concludes contracts 
with particular producers.
There is an essential difference here in relation to the tele-
communication sector. The network manager in that sector 
can take charge of the stability of his network with total 
autonomy and does not need to call on any other players.
The system operator takes charge of the operational 
management of the transmission network. However, the 
breaking up of the electricity sector also gives rise to coor-
dination problems in other segments, including distribu-
tion. Take the case of a consumer changing supplier. The 
new supplier and the consumer agree on a price for future 
supplies. However, for invoicing purposes the supplier also 
needs to know the quantity of electricity consumed, but it 
is the distributor who has that information.
The distributor can make that information available to 
the supplier so long as he knows who the supplier is. The 
distributor therefore needs to know the supplier for each 
customer in his region, purely so that the supplier can 
invoice the customer. The distributor has no functional 
need for that information. In the event of a change of 
supplier, both the new and the old supplier therefore have 
to be informed, as well as the distributor.
To  prevent distortion of competition in the production 
segment, it is possible to enact legislation requiring strict 
segregation between electricity production and transport. 
However, at the same time it has become apparent that 
such a split makes it difﬁ  cult to coordinate the system as 
a whole. Consequently, liberalisation can only be consid-
ered after examining to what extent the split :
1.   does not endanger the reliability of the system  ; it is 
the system operator’s job to guarantee that reliability. 
However, as demonstrated above, he is dependent on 
other parties in that respect.
2.   entails additional expense (e.g. exchange of informa-
tion). The operational management of the network is 
not new, and was already present in the old system. 
However, splitting the sector into various segments 
increases the need to exchange information.
2.7.2  Organisation of the markets
Within a vertically integrated operation, coordination 
between the various segments is an internal matter. 
However, the introduction of competition into certain 
sub-segments means that coordination is effected via a 
market mechanism. One has the choice among bilateral 
contracts between a consumer and a producer or the 
creation of an electricity exchange. Bilateral contracts ﬁ  x 
a future price and quantity and as such reduce uncertainly. 
They are often used by big industrial consumers. On an 
exchange the price is determinated by the equilibrum 
between offer and demand and as such is very volatile. 
The exchange price is know to all participants, so it is 
more transparent than contracts (where the price is con-
ﬁ  dential) , As such exchanges have a pricesignalling goal. 
Most countries opt for a combination of contracts and an 
exchange  (2).The costs incurred in concluding contracts or 
in the creation and the operation of an exchange are part 
of the fore-mentioned transaction cocts.
In summary the market mechanism can be :
− Bilateral contracts that are extremely ﬂ  exible
−   An electricity exchange. However, owing to the com-
plexity of electricity production, and more particularly 
the sometimes protracted start-up times for power sta-
tions, multiple submarkets exist on an exchange :
  -   a market where potential customers and producers 
can submit bids up to 24 hours before the actual time 
of supply (“day-ahead” market) ;
  -   a ﬁ  ne-tuning market where corrections can be made 
until a few hours before the time of supply ;
  -   a real-time market where equilibrium is guaranteed at 
the time of supply ;
  -    ﬁ  nancial markets where price risks can be hedged.
   The necessity and the operation of these submarkets 
are the subject of the following paragraphs.
2.7.2.1  Day-ahead market
In order to give all participants (demanders, suppliers and 
the network operator) an initial indication of demand for 
the next day, a so-called day-ahead market is organised. 
Here, all bidders can submit offers for their estimated 
  production or consumption for each hour of the next 
day. The bids must be submitted at least 24 hours before-
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The day is divided up into 24 hours in view of the high 
intra-day volatility of demand for electricity.
Buyers therefore all indicate their demand curve for each 
hour of the next day. For an illustration, see table 5 below.
If the price for the ﬁ   rst 6  hours of the day is below 
40  euro/MWh, then 50  MWh will be bought in. If the 
price is between 40  and 60  euro/MWh the quantity is 
reduced to 20 MWh.
Every producer makes an offer like this, and the quantity 
to be supplied will be greater the higher the price.
Next, the market authority will aggregate the individual 
demand and supply curves of all participants. This results 
in a single demand curve and a single supply curve for 
each hour of the next day, with an equilibrium price per 
hour (see chart 7).
Despite the variation in electricity production techniques, 
there is thus only one equilibrium price per hour (see chart 7).
The market price is therefore the price of the most expen-
sive power station that has to be brought in to meet the 
demand. This naturally means that all cheaper power sta-
tions can make an additional margin.
Chart 3 showed that the average costs of a nuclear power 
station in Finland come to roughly 24 euro  /  MWh. The 
minimum production costs for a CCGT power station 
total 32 euro  /  MWh (in both cases, for production of 
8,000 hours per annum, excluding CO2 costs, and with 
the price of natural gas remaining constant). As a result, 
as soon as the nuclear capacity is insufﬁ   cient to meet 
demand  (1), a nuclear power station will make a margin of 
at least 8 euro / MWh.
However, for completeness it must be pointed out that 
this applies only to offers on the market (where the price 
is determined on the basis of the mechanism described 
above). However, a producer can also conclude bilateral 
contracts with a buyer, specifying a lower price. In that case, 
the margin is lower but the nuclear producer undoubtedly 
has a competitive advantage  (2).
Finally, it should be pointed out that this day-ahead 
information gives the network manager some warning of 
potential congestion problems during particular hours on 
the next day  (3).
2.7.2.2  Fine-tuning market
On the day-ahead market, prices are set on the basis of 
the estimates of the individual producers and consumers 
24  hours before the actual time of supply. Since the actual 
amounts supplied will depend on numerous parameters, 
including the temperature on the next day, fuel costs, etc., 
they seldom tally with the estimates. At best, they are a 
good approximation.
As a result, participants can adjust their predictions as 
their information becomes more accurate. For that pur-
pose, they can submit offers on the ﬁ  ne-tuning market 
until a few hours before the actual start time.
CHART 7  AGGREGATED DEMAND AND AGGREGATED 





















(1)  Table 3 shows that, for Belgium, the nuclear power stations have a capacity of 
5.7 GW, and chart 7 shows that the minimum load is 6 GW, So nuclear producers 
realise a margin. This undoubtedly also applies to all nuclear power stations 
within a uniﬁ  ed European market.
(2)  In the scenario with no nuclear power, this competitive advantage disappears, but 
the cost to the buyer increases to the level of the CCGT power station. Ceteris 
paribus, this means that the price would rise by almost 33 p.c. in any case.
(3)  Provided this information also contains data on network junctions where the 
supplier will inject current into the network and where the consumer will extract 
this current, and on the quantities supplied via bilateral contracts.
TABLE 5 INDIVIDUAL DEMAND CURVE FOR EACH HOUR 
OF THE FOLLOWING DAY
Hour Price
(in €/MWh)
from to <40 40 60 200 2,000
1 65 02 01 0 0 – 2 0
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(1)  In order to limit the risk for the clearing house, each market participant will be 
asked to pay a margin that corresponds to his outstanding positions with the 
clearing house. This margin is adjusted daily, a process known as “marking to 
market”.
(2)  AMPERE (2000) quotes a construction time of 24 to 30 months for a CCGT, and 
3 to 5 years for a nuclear power station.
(3)  This assumption is presumably more valid in countries where electricity is 
generated mainly by HEP stations, at least for the producer/owner of those power 
stations, and not for the other producers or for consumers.
2.7.2.3  Real-time market
Pricing on the day-ahead market and on the ﬁ  ne-tuning 
market is based on estimates of future production and 
consumption. Those markets therefore guarantee that the 
estimated demand is in equilibrium with the estimated 
supply.
However, section 2.2  showed that it is crucial for the 
actual demand and the actual supply to be in equilibrium 
at all times. If that condition is not met, the result could 
be a total black-out.
As stated earlier, the independent system operator is 
responsible for achieving that balance. For that purpose, 
he can call on the real-time market where he is the sole 
buyer.
That real-time market can also be used to redispatch pro-
duction in the event of congestion problems.
2.7.2.4 Financial market
Apart from these markets for the physical supply of 
electricity, “derivative” markets have been set up to give 
participants the opportunity to hedge the highly volatile 
price of electricity, and to provide them with information 
on future movements in prices.
These are ﬁ  nancial markets because the transactions are 
not accompanied by any physical supply of electric cur-
rent. These derivative instruments are not unique to the 
electricity sector, but also exist for other commodities, so 
they will only be discussed brieﬂ  y here.
By way of explanation, we shall ﬁ  rst deﬁ  ne a forward. 
It is a contract for the physical supply of electricity. This 
contract states the price and quantity of electricity which 
a producer will supply to a consumer at a particular point 
in time in the future. These are therefore customised 
contracts, concluded between two parties. Both buyer 
and seller are sure of a ﬁ  xed price and a ﬁ  xed quantity 
for the future.
Future  contracts are similar, except that they relate to 
a standardised quantity of a standardised commodity. 
Standardisation makes futures more ﬂ  exible  and  more 
liquid. The liquidity is increased even more by the estab-
lishment of a “clearing house” that acts as the counter-
party for each transaction (1). This guaranteed counterparty 
reduces the risk of non-payment of the contract, and as 
such increases de liquidity of the market.
Future contracts are seldom accompanied by physical 
supply. After expiry of the contract on the due date, 
the parties exchange between themselves the difference 
between the price on the physical market and the price 
ﬁ  xed in the contract.
Apart from buyers and sellers, there are also specula-
tors and arbitragists on the futures market. The price 
of the future is determined by the demand and supply 
relating to a future with ﬁ  xed parameters. Models for 
the determination of the price of a future establish a 
link between the future value and the expected price 
of electricity. Thus, the future price contains informa-
tion on the expected price of electricity. In that way, 
futures therefore represent an important aid not only 
for buyers but also for producers and investors in pro-
duction capacity. However, in this connection it must be 
pointed out that :
1.   the term of a future is limited (on the Scandinavian 
electricity exchange, Nordpool, it is 3 years maxi-
mum), while it takes many years to build a power 
station  (2).
2.   the models for determining the prices of futures are 
based on the assumption that the underlying product 
can be stored for a particular period of time (namely 
until the due date of the contract). That assumption 
does not apply to electricity production  (3).
While a future contract entails an obligation on both 
buyer and seller, an option contract confers a right on 
one of the two parties. If the seller has the right (but not 
the obligation) to supply a given quantity of electricity at 
a speciﬁ  ed price on a speciﬁ  ed future date, that is called 
a put option. If the buyer has the right to buy a speciﬁ  ed 
quantity of electricity at a speciﬁ  ed price in the future, 
that is a call option. It is therefore an asymmetrical con-
tract  ; one party has an obligation, the other party has a 
right to exercise an option.
Conclusion
The liberalisation of the electricity sector is motivated by the 
effort to increase efﬁ  ciency, and is meant to bring down 
prices. At least, that is what the theoretical, perfect com-
petition model predicts. The successful deregulation of the 
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(1)  In the context of the Belgian market, with nuclear capacity of 5.8 GW and a 
base load of 6 GW, these economies of scale lead to a dominant position. That 
is not the case in the context of the European market. Owing to interconnection 
problems, the European market currently only exists in theory. For obvious 
reasons, however, it is not a good idea to have competition between nuclear 
producers.
paradigm, as there is no denying that the liberalisation of 
that sector has led to lower prices and better quality.
However, this article has emphasised that, apart from the 
analogies, there are also substantial differences between 
the two sectors. They are comparable as regards both the 
network structure and a number of technological devel-
opments which have reduced the scale effects. However, 
on the other hand there are major differences in the com-
plexity and implementation of the liberalisation. Not only 
does the electricity sector have more sub-segments, for 
technical reasons it is also far more difﬁ  cult, and consider-
ably trickier, to coordinate the sub-segments.
As regards the implementation of liberalisation, it was 
pointed out that the production and supply of electricity 
have been liberalised while the transmission and distribu-
tion monopolies remain. In contrast, in the telecommunica-
tion sector, it was speciﬁ  cally in the network infrastructure 
that competition was introduced. The argument that both 
segments (production of electricity and the communication 
infrastructure) had long been seen as (natural) monopolies 
and that the economies of scale were being diminished by 
technological changes appears open to criticism. In the 
telecommunication sector, technological advances were in 
fact accompanied by an enormous expansion in demand. 
The larger market combined with smaller scale networks 
makes it possible to have a greater number of network 
operators. Such an expansion in demand is not occurring in 
the electricity sector, however ; on the contrary. As a result 
of environmental considerations, efforts are instead being 
made to limit electricity consumption.
The electricity sector consists of various sub-segments, 
namely production, transmission, distribution and sale. 
Competition is being introduced into production and sale. 
Transmission and distribution remain monopolies. The dis-
cussion of the speciﬁ  c characteristics and problems of the 
various segments showed that two points must be borne 
in mind if it is decided to deregulate the sector :
1.   Breaking up the previously vertically integrated 
operation may entail additional costs – transaction 
costs – especially if it requires coordination between 
the segments or if information needs to be exchanged 
on a large scale.
2.   If the introduction of competition in some segments 
is to have a beneﬁ  cial inﬂ  uence on prices, then one 
should aim to meet the conditions of the theoretical 
model. According to the basic assumptions of the 
perfect competition model, no individual producer or 
consumer can inﬂ  uence the price, producers and con-
sumers have perfect information, the product being 
traded is homogeneous and the producers are free to 
enter or leave the market.
It is also clear that the speciﬁ  c characteristics of the sector 
hamper competition.
The physical characteristics of electricity networks require 
demand and supply to be in equilibrium at all times ; if they 
are not, then the whole system fails. In combination with 
the high volatility of demand for electricity, this imposes 
very speciﬁ   c requirements on the production facilities. 
Thus, there must always be sufﬁ   cient reserve capacity 
available to cope with peak demand. That reserve capacity 
is very expensive since it will potentially be used for just a 
few hours each year. During those peak periods, it is there-
fore power stations with low ﬁ  xed costs that will be used. 
During periods of low demand, the ﬁ  xed costs are spread 
over a large number of hours’ production and the power 
stations with high ﬁ  xed costs are the most efﬁ  cient. In prac-
tice, this means that during periods of low demand nuclear 
power stations and (accumulation) HEP stations are used  ; 
during peak periods, gas and coal-ﬁ  red power stations are 
used. This means large variations in costs and hence differ-
ences in price between peak and off-peak periods.
The high ﬁ  xed costs of “off-peak” capacity also imply the 
existence of economies of scale, limiting competition in 
this segment. Competition among different producers 
can be more or less ruled out owing to the economies 
of scale  (1)  and for safety reasons, too, in the case of 
nuclear power stations. This fact is clearly at odds with 
the assumption of free access.
Competition is therefore conﬁ  ned to the capacity which 
is used during peak periods. Producers with mixed pro-
duction facilities (off-peak and peak capacity) have a sig-
niﬁ  cant advantage because, owing to the single market 
price, they make a margin on their “off-peak capacity”. 
That enables them to inﬂ   uence the price and access 
(cross-subsidies between cheaper and more expensive 
production methods)  ; these producers are therefore not 
price-takers.
Overloading of certain parts of the network (e.g. the 
limited capacity for interlinking on the European market) 
creates an access barrier.
The difference between peak and off-peak periods and 
the capacity used imply that electricity is not homogene-
ous. In fact, there is a product for every hour of the day, 
as is evident from the way in which electricity exchanges 
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Furthermore, variations in regulations between countries, 
particularly as regards nuclear power stations and the 
application of the Kyoto protocol, contribute towards 
distortion of competition.
The need for reserve capacity makes it necessary for the 
free market to give signals in time for the construction of 
future capacity. Both the classical theory of the net present 
value of an investment and the more recent theory of real 
options reveal a negative correlation between invest-
ment and uncertainty. It is therefore far from certain that 
the free market mechanism will generate the stimulus 
required to provide reserve capacity. In the initial phase 
of liberalisation, the surplus capacity which exists almost 
everywhere is dismantled ; however, there is no guarantee 
that this dismantling will not ultimately result in a short-
age of capacity with higher consumer prices and addi-
tional margins for producers.
The typical characteristics of the electricity network make 
it necessary to have a system coordinator and a large-scale 
exchange of information between participants. That con-
tributes towards the transaction costs mentioned earlier.
Interaction between network limitations and the pro-
duction segment can create local market power. That is 
currently already the case in the European market, where 
capacity for interconnections is inadequate.
It is therefore not clear that the fall in price brought about 
by deregulation will be permanent. In the initial phase, the 
introduction of competition may certainly have a favour-
able impact due to the reduction of excess capacity, but 
the increased transaction costs and the impediments to 
competition resulting from the speciﬁ  c characteristics of 
the sector may ultimately lead to a attenuation of this 
beneﬁ   t or to a compensatory movement. Finally, there 
are elements unconnected with deregulation which could 
have an adverse effect on prices, such as the tariff charged 
for CO2 emissions and the dismantling of nuclear power 
stations. In addition, these last two elements increase 
demand for natural gas, thus pushing up its price.
In view of the intermediate character of electricity con-
sumption, this will have repercussions on all other sectors 
of the economy. If the operators in the various European 
regions are subject to different rules, the competitiveness 
can be affected. A uniform policy within the EU is there-
fore a prerequisite.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the heaviest costs 
entailed in electricity production stem from the fact 
that current cannot be stored and from the volatility of 
demand, which necessitates substantial reserve capacity 
to cope with peaks. In order to keep costs to a mini-
mum (including the environmental costs), it is therefore 
necessary to even out peaks in consumption  ; it is not 
consumption itself that has to be reduced, it is the peaks 
that need to be lowered. Finding ways of storing electric-
ity is another possible solution, though it is probably not 
feasible in the short term.30 NBB WORKING PAPER No. 59 – SEPT. 2004
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